

#### CS2080: Applied Privacy for Data Science Reconstruction Attacks

School of Engineering & Applied Sciences Harvard University

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# Discussion

Imagine that you and your tablemates are on an advisory committee tasked with making recommendations to lawmakers about data privacy. Specifically, they want to know how seriously to take the evidence found by computer scientists against de-identification. Does it warrant changes to how data are protected? Why or why not?

If you are at an ODD numbered table, form your strongest arguments *in favor* of de-identification.

If you are at an EVEN numbered table, form your strongest arguments *against* de-identification.

#### Cohen & Nissim

#### Linear Program Reconstruction in Practice

"The goal of Diffix is to allow data analysts to perform an unlimited number of statistical queries on a sensitive database while protecting the underlying data and while introducing only minimal error. It is advertised as an off-the-shelf, GDPR-compliant privacy solution, and Aircloak reports that CNIL, the French national data protection authority, has already evaluated Diffex against the GDPR anonymity criteria. and have stated that Aircloak delivers GDPR-level anonymity."

#### Cohen & Nissim

Linear Program Reconstruction in Practice

- Use queries of sums over random subsets to reconstruct individual data.
- Importantly, the members of the subset are reported in each sum.
- Received the Aircloak Bounty (\$5000) for reidentifying challenge data in the *Diffix* commercial system.

https://journalprivacyconfidentiality.org/ index.php/jpc/article/view/711

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#### Linear Program Reconstruction in Practice

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- Importantly, the members of the subset are reported in each sum.
- Received the Aircloak Bounty (\$5000) for reidentifying challenge data in the *Diffix* commercial system.
  - Thm [Dinur-Nissim `03]: given m = n uniformly random sets  $S_j$  and answers  $a_j$  s.t.  $|a_j q_{S_j}(x)| \le E = o(\sqrt{n})$ , whp adversary can reconstruct 1 o(1) fraction of the bits  $x_i$ .

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From CS109:

True vs. Statistical Model

We will assume that the response variable, *Y*, relates to the predictors, *X*, through some unknown function expressed generally as:

 $Y = f(X) + \varepsilon$ 

Regression Based Reconstruction Find  $\hat{x_1}, \dots, \hat{x_N}$  s.t.:



In R see: lm() In Python see for example: linear\_model.LinearRegression() from scikit-learn.

$$a_j = x_1 s_{1,j} + x_2 s_{2,j} + \ldots + x_n s_{n,j} + e_j$$

- *n* is the number of people in the database
- *m* is the number of queries
- *i* is a person index
- *j* is query index
- $a_i$  is *j*-th query release
- $s_{i,j}$  is a  $\{0,1\}$ -indicator  $i \in S_j$
- $x_h$  is *h*'s sensitive data
- $e_i$  is the residual/error of the *i*-th prediction

$$a_{j} = x_{1}s_{1,j} + x_{2}s_{2,j} + \ldots + x_{n}s_{n,j} + e_{j}$$

$$7 = 1 \cdot 1 + 0 \cdot 1 + 1 \cdot 0 + 0 \cdot 0 + \ldots + 0 \cdot 1 + 2$$

$$4 = 1 \cdot 0 + 0 \cdot 1 + 1 \cdot 1 + 0 \cdot 1 + \ldots + 0 \cdot 1 + (-1)$$

$$6 = 1 \cdot 0 + 0 \cdot 0 + 1 \cdot 0 + 0 \cdot 1 + \ldots + 0 \cdot 0 + 3$$

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$$a_{j} = \hat{x}_{1}s_{1,j} + \hat{x}_{2}s_{2,j} + \ldots + \hat{x}_{n}s_{n,j} + e_{j}$$

$$7 = 0.92 \cdot 1 + 0.11 \cdot 1 + 1.07 \cdot 0 + -0.08 \cdot 0 + \ldots + 0.07 \cdot 1 + 5.71$$

$$4 = 0.92 \cdot 0 + 0.11 \cdot 1 + 1.07 \cdot 1 + -0.08 \cdot 1 + \ldots + 0.07 \cdot 1 + 2.31$$

$$6 = 0.92 \cdot 0 + 0.11 \cdot 0 + 1.07 \cdot 0 + -0.08 \cdot 1 + \ldots + 0.07 \cdot 0 - 1.04$$

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Example

#### From wk2\_regression\_attack.ipynb:

**Reconstruction of Latino Variable** 

Reconstruction of Latino Variable



#### Example: Rounding to Nearest 5

**Reconstruction Fraction Over Number of Queries** 



Number of Queries

#### Example: Rounding to Nearest 5 w/ Priors

**Reconstruction Fraction Over Number of Queries** 



## Example: Normal Errors

**Reconstruction Fraction Over Number of Queries** 



Number of Queries